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Abstract
We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close
to having a certain nice structure, as for instance single-peaked, single-caved, single-
crossing, value-restricted, best-restricted, worst-restricted, medium-restricted, or group-
separable profiles. We measure this distance by the number of voters or alternatives
that have to be deleted to make the profile a nicely structured one. Our results classify
the problem variants with respect to their computational complexity, and draw a clear
line between computationally tractable (polynomial-time solvable) and computationally
intractable (NP-hard) questions.
1 Introduction
The area of Social Choice (and in particular the subarea of Computational Social Choice) is
full of so-called negative results. On the one hand there are many axiomatic impossibility
results, and on the other hand there are just as many computational intractability results.
For instance, the famous impossibility result of Arrow [3] states that there is no perfectly fair
way (satisfying certain desirable axioms) of aggregating the preferences of a society of voters
into a single preference order. As another example, Bartholdi III et al. [8] establish that it is
computationally intractable (NP-hard) to determine whether some particular alternative has
won an election under a voting scheme designed by Lewis Carroll. Most of these negative
results hold for general preference profiles where any combination of preference orders may
occur.
One branch of Social Choice studies restricted domains of preference profiles, where only
certain nicely structured combinations of preference orders are admissible. The standard
example for this approach are single-peaked preference profiles as introduced by Black [10]:
a preference profile is single-peaked if there exists a linear order of the alternatives such that
every voter’s preference along this order is either always strictly increasing, always strictly
decreasing, or first strictly increasing and then strictly decreasing. Determining whether a
profile is single-peaked is solvable in polynomial time [7, 22, 30].
∗A preliminary short version of this work has been presented at the 23rd International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2013), Beijing, August, 2013 [13].
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Single-peakedness implies a number of nice properties, as for instance strategy-proofness
of a family of voting rules [42] and transitivity of the majority relation [36]. Furthermore,
Arrow’s impossibility result collapses for single-peaked profiles. In a similar spirit (but in
the algorithmic branch), Walsh [51], Brandt et al. [11], and Faliszewski et al. [31] show that
many electoral bribery, control and manipulation problems that are NP-hard in the general
case become tractable under single-peaked profiles. Besides the single-peaked domain, the
literature contains many other restricted domains of nicely structured preference profiles (see
Section 2 for precise mathematical definitions).
• Sen [47] and Sen and Pattanaik [46] introduced the domain of value-restricted preference
profiles which satisfy the following: for every triple of alternatives, one alternative is not
preferred most by any individual (best-restricted profile), or one is not preferred least
by any individual (worst-restricted profile), or one is not considered as the intermediate
alternative by any individual (medium-restricted profile).
• Inada [35, 36] considered the domain of group-separable preference profiles which satisfy
the following: the alternatives can be split into two groups such that every voter prefers
every alternative in the first group to those in the second group, or prefers every alter-
native in the second group to those in the first group. Every group-separable profile is
also medium-restricted.
• Single-caved preference profiles are derived from single-peaked profiles by reversing
the preferences of every voter. Sometimes single-caved profiles are also called single-
dipped [37].
• Single-crossing preference profiles go back to the seminal papers of Mirrlees [40] and
Roberts [45] on income taxation. A preference profile is single-crossing if there exists a
linear order of the voters such that each pair of alternatives separates this order into two
sub-orders where in each sub-order, all voters agree on the relative order of this pair.
Similar to the single-peaked property, single-crossing profiles can also be recognized in
polynomial time [12, 22, 26].
Unfortunately, real-world elections are almost never single-peaked, value-restricted, group-
separable, single-caved or single-crossing. Usually there are maverick voters whose preferences
are determined for instance by race, religion, or gender, and whose misfit behaviors destroy
all nice structures in the preference profile. In a very recent line of research, Faliszewski et al.
[32] searched for a cure against such mavericks, and arrived at nearly single-peaked prefer-
ence profiles: a profile is nearly single-peaked if it is very close to a single-peaked profile.
Of course there are many mathematical ways of measuring the closeness of profiles. Natural
ways to make a given profile single-peaked are (i) by deletion of voters and (ii) by deletion
of alternatives. This leads to the two central problems of our work for a specific property Π
and a given number k:
1. The Π Maverick Deletion problem asks whether it is possible to delete at most
k voters to make a given profile satisfy the Π-property.
2. The Π Alternative Deletion problem asks whether it is possible to delete at most
k alternatives to make a given profile satisfy the Π-property.
In this paper, we have Π ∈ {worst-restricted, medium-restricted, best-restricted, value-
restricted, single-peaked, single-caved, single-crossing, group-separable, β-restricted}. We
provide the formal definitions of these properties in Section 2.
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Restriction Maverick deletion Alternative deletion
Single-peaked NP-complete (*, Corollary 1) P (*)
Single-caved NP-complete (*, Corollary 1) P (*)
Group-separable NP-complete (Corollary 1) NP-complete (Corollary 2)
Single-crossing P (Theorem 6) NP-complete (Theorem 5)
Value-restricted NP-complete (Theorem 1) NP-complete (Theorem 2)
Best-restricted NP-complete (Proposition 1) NP-complete (Proposition 2)
Worst-restricted NP-complete (Proposition 1) NP-complete (Proposition 2)
Medium-restricted NP-complete (Proposition 1) NP-complete (Proposition 2)
β-restricted NP-complete (Theorem 3) NP-complete (Theorem 4)
Table 1: Summary of the results where P means polynomial-time solvable. Entries marked
by “*” are due to Erde´lyi et al. [29]. The definition of the respective domain restrictions can
be found in Section 2.
Results of this paper. We investigate the problem of deciding how close (by deletion of
voters and by deletion of alternatives) a given preference profile is to having a nice structure
(like being single-peaked, or single-crossing, or group-separable). We focus on the most fun-
damental definitions of closeness and on the most popular restricted domains. Our results
draw a clear line between computationally easy (polynomial-time solvable) and computa-
tionally intractable (NP-hard) questions as they classify all considered problem variants with
respect to their computational complexity. In particular, for most of the cases both of our
central problems are computationally intractable (with the exceptions of maverick deletion
when the specific property Π is single-crossing, and of alternative deletion when Π is either
single-peaked or single-caved). Our results are summarized in Table 1.
Related work. As to different notions of closeness to restricted domains,
• Erde´lyi et al. [29] study various concepts of nearly single-peakedness. Besides deletion
of voters and deletion of alternatives, they also study closeness measures that are based
on swapping alternatives in the preference orders of some voters, or on introducing
additional political axes.
• Yang and Guo [52] study k-peaked domains, where every preference order can have at
most k peaks (that is, at most k rising streaks that alternate with falling streaks).
• Cornaz et al. [19, 20] introduce a closeness measure, the width, for single-peaked, single-
crossing, and group-separable profiles which is based on the notion of a clone set [50].
For instance, the single-peaked width of a preference profile is the smallest number k
such that partitioning all alternatives into disjoint intervals, each with size at most k+1,
and replacing each of these intervals with a single alternative results in a single-peaked
profile. An interval of alternatives is a set of alternatives that appear consecutively (in
any order) in the preference orders of all voters.
There are several generalizations of the single-peaked property. For instance, Barbera`
et al. [6] introduce the concept of multi-dimensional single-peaked domains. The 1-dimensional
special case is equivalent to our single-peaked property. Sui et al. [49] study this concept
empirically. They present approximation algorithms (for several optimization goals) of find-
ing multi-dimensional single-peaked profiles and show that their two real-world data sets
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are far from being single-peaked but are nearly 2-dimensional single-peaked. While Erde´lyi
et al. [29] and this paper show that deciding the distance to restricted domains is NP-hard
in most cases, Elkind and Lackner [25] present efficient approximation and fixed-parameter
tractable algorithms for deciding the distance to restricted domains such as single-peakedness
and single-crossingness.
Finally, we remark that the closeness concept can also be used to characterize voting
rules [4, 27, 39]. The basic idea is to first fix a specific property, for instance, the transitivity
of the pairwise majority relation (also known as Condorcet consistency), and then to define a
closeness measure from a given profile to the “nearest” profile with this specific property. For
instance, the Young rule [53] takes the subprofile that is closest to being Condorcet consistent
by deleting the fewest number of voters and selects the corresponding Condorcet winner as
a winner; see Elkind et al. [27] for more information on this.
For restricted and nearly restricted domains, there are various studies on single-winner
determination [11], on multi-winner determination [9, 48], on control, manipulation, and
bribery [11, 15, 31, 32], and on possible/necessary winner problems [51]. Usually, the expecta-
tion is that domain restrictions help in lowering the computational complexity of many voting
problems. Many publications, however, report that this is not always the case. For instance,
Faliszewski et al. [32] show that the computational complexity of “controlling approval-based
rules” for nearly single-peaked profiles is polynomial-time solvable if the distance to single-
peaked is a constant, and thus, coincides with the one for single-peaked profiles, whereas the
computational complexity of “manipulating the veto rule” for nearly single-peaked profiles
is still NP-hard and thus, coincides with the one for unrestricted profiles.
Article outline. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes all the basic
definitions and notations. Our results are presented in Sections 3 to 5:
1. Section 3 presents results for the value-restricted, best-restricted, worst-restricted, and
medium-restricted properties. All results are NP-hardness results and are obtained
through reduction from the NP-complete Vertex Cover problem (see the beginning
of Section 3 for the definition).
2. Section 4 shows results for single-peakedness, single-cavedness, and group-separability.
In addition, this section shows results for the β-restricted property, a necessary condi-
tion for group-separability. Again, all results are NP-hardness results and are obtained
through reduction from Vertex Cover.
3. Section 5 shows that achieving the single-crossing property by deleting as few alter-
natives as possible is NP-hard; the reduction is from the NP-complete Maximum 2-
Satisfiability problem (see the beginning of Section 5 for the definition), and shows
that finding a single-crossing profile with the largest voter set is polynomial-time solv-
able; this is done by reducing the problem to finding a longest path in a directed acyclic
graph.
We conclude with some future research directions in the last section.
2 Preliminaries and basic notations
Let a1, . . . , am be m alternatives and let v1, . . . , vn be n voters. A preference profile specifies
the preference orders of the n voters, where voter vi ranks the alternatives according to a
linear order ≻i over the m alternatives. For alternatives a and b, the relation a ≻i b means
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Figure 1: A Hasse diagram for the relation of the different properties. An edge between two
properties means that a profile with the property in the lower tier implies the property in the
upper tier. For instance, there is an edge between “value-restricted” and “best-restricted”,
because a best-restricted profile is also value-restricted.
that voter vi strictly prefers a to b. We omit the subscript i if it is clear from the context
whose preference order we are referring to.
Given two disjoint sets A and B of alternatives, we write A ≻i B to express that voter vi
prefers set A to set B, that is, for each alternative a ∈ A and each alternative b ∈ B it holds
that a ≻i b. We write A ≻i b as shorthand for A ≻i {b} and b ≻i A for {b} ≻i A. We
sometimes fix a canonical order of the alternatives in A and denote this order by 〈A〉. The
expression 〈A1〉 ≻ 〈A2〉 denotes the preference order that is consistent with 〈A1〉, 〈A2〉, and
A1 ≻ A2.
Next, we review some preference profiles with special properties studied in the litera-
ture [5, 12, 35, 36, 46, 47]. We call such profiles configurations and we use them to char-
acterize some properties of the preference profiles. We illustrate the relation between the
respective properties in Figure 1.
2.1 Value-restricted profiles
The first three configurations [5] describe profiles with three alternatives where each alterna-
tive is in the best, medium, or worst position in some voter’s preference order.
Definition 1 (Best-diverse configuration). A profile with three voters v1, v2, v3, and three
distinct alternatives a, b, c is a best-diverse configuration if it satisfies the following:
voter v1 : a ≻ {b, c},
voter v2 : b ≻ {a, c},
voter v3 : c ≻ {a, b}.
Definition 2 (Medium-diverse configuration). A profile with three voters v1, v2, v3, and
three distinct alternatives a, b, c is a medium-diverse configuration if it satisfies the following:
voter v1 : b ≻ a ≻ c or c ≻ a ≻ b,
voter v2 : a ≻ b ≻ c or c ≻ b ≻ a,
voter v3 : a ≻ c ≻ b or b ≻ c ≻ a.
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Definition 3 (worst-diverse configuration). A profile with three voters v1, v2, v3 and three
distinct alternatives a,b,c is a worst-diverse configuration if it satisfies the following:
voter v1 : {b, c} ≻ a,
voter v2 : {a, c} ≻ b,
voter v3 : {a, b} ≻ c.
We use these three configurations to characterize several restricted domains: A pro-
file is best-restricted (resp. medium-restricted, worst-restricted) with respect to a triple of
alternatives if it contains no three voters that form a best-diverse configuration (resp. a
medium-diverse configuration, a worst-diverse configuration) with respect to this triple. A
profile is best-restricted (resp.medium-restricted, worst-restricted) if it is best-restricted (resp.
medium-restricted, worst-restricted) with respect to every possible triple of alternatives.
A profile is value-restricted [47] if for every triple T of alternatives, it is best-restricted,
medium-restricted, or worst-restricted with respect to T . In other words, a profile is not
value-restricted if and only if it contains a triple of alternatives and three voters v1, v2, v3
that form a best-diverse configuration, a medium-diverse configuration, and a worst-diverse
configurationwith respect to this triple.
Definition 4 (Cyclic configuration). A profile with three voters v1, v2, v3 and three distinct
alternatives a,b,c is a cyclic configuration if it satisfies the following:
voter v1 : a ≻ b ≻ c,
voter v2 : b ≻ c ≻ a,
voter v3 : c ≻ a ≻ b.
The set of the preference orders of all voters in a value-restricted profile is also known
as acyclic domain of linear orders. Many research groups [1, 2, 41, 44] investigate maximal
acyclic domains for a given number m of alternatives, where an acyclic domain is maximal
if adding any new linear order destroys the value-restricted property.
2.2 Single-peaked profiles and single-caved profiles
Given a set A of alternatives and a linear order L over A, we say that a voter v is single-
peaked with respect to L if his preference along L is always strictly increasing, always strictly
decreasing, or first strictly increasing and then strictly decreasing. Formally, a voter v is
single-peaked with respect to L if for each three distinct alternatives a, b, c ∈ A, it holds that
(a ≻L b ≻L c or c ≻L b ≻L a) implies that if a ≻v b, then b ≻v c.
A profile with the alternative set A is single-peaked if there is a linear order over A such that
every voter is single-peaked with respect to this order. Single-peaked profiles are necessarily
worst-restricted. To see this, we observe that in a profile with at least three alternatives, the
alternative that is ranked last by at least one voter must not be placed between the other
two along any single-peaked order. But then, none of the alternatives a, b, and c from a
worst-diverse configuration can be placed between the other two in any single-peaked order.
Thus, a profile with worst-diverse configurations cannot be single-peaked.
To fully characterize the single-peaked domain, we additionally need the following con-
figuration.
Definition 5 (α-configuration). A profile with two voters v1 and v2, and four distinct alter-
natives a, b, c, d is an α-configuration if it satisfies the following:
voter v1 : {a, d} ≻ b ≻ c,
voter v2 : {c, d} ≻ b ≻ a.
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The α-configuration describes a situation where two voters have opposite opinions on the
order of three alternatives a, b and c but agree that a fourth alternative d is “better” than
the one ranked in the middle. A profile with this configuration is not single-peaked as we
must put alternatives b and d between alternatives a and c, but then voter v1 prevents us
from putting b next to a and voter v2 prevents us from putting b next to c.
A profile is single-peaked if and only if it contains neither worst-diverse configurations nor
α-configurations [5]. Since reversing the preference orders of a single-peaked profile results in
a single-caved one, an analogous characterization of single-caved profiles follows. A profile is
single-caved if and only if it contains neither best-diverse configurations nor α¯-configurations
where a α¯-configuration is a α-configuration with both “preference orders” being inverted:
Definition 6 (α¯-configuration). A profile with two voters v1 and v2, and four distinct alter-
natives a, b, c, d is an α¯-configuration if it satisfies the following:
voter v1 : a ≻ b ≻ {c, d},
voter v2 : c ≻ b ≻ {a, d}.
2.3 Group-separable profiles
Given a profile with A being the set of alternatives, the group-separable property requires
that every size-at-least-three subset A′ ⊆ A can be partitioned into two disjoint non-empty
subsets A′1 and A
′
2 such that for each voter vi, either A
′
1 ≻i A
′
2 or A
′
2 ≻i A
′
1 holds. One
can verify that group-separable profiles are necessarily medium-restricted. Ballester and
Haeringer [5] characterized the group-separable property using the following configuration.
Definition 7 (β-configuration).
A profile with two voters v1 and v2 and four distinct alternatives a, b, c, d is a β-configuration
if it satisfies the following:
voter v1 : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d,
voter v2 : b ≻ d ≻ a ≻ c.
The β-configuration describes a situation where the most preferred alternative and the
least preferred alternative of voter v1 are a and d which are different from the ones of voter v2:
b and c. Both voters agree that b is better than c, but disagree on whether d is better than
a. This profile is not group-separable: We can not partition {a, b, c, d} into one singleton
and one three-alternatives set as each alternative is ranked in the middle once, but neither
can we partition them into two sets each of size two since voter v1 prevents us from putting
alternatives a and c or alternatives a and d together and voter v2 prevents us from putting
alternatives a and b together. Profiles without β-configurations are called β-restricted [5].
A profile is group-separable if and only if it contains neither medium-diverse configurations
nor β-configurations [5].
2.4 Single-crossing profiles
The single-crossing property describes the existence of a “natural” linear order of the voters.
A preference profile is single-crossing if there exists a single-crossing order of the voters,
that is, a linear order L of the voters, such that each pair of alternatives separates L into
two sub-orders where in each sub-order, all voters agree on the relative order of this pair.
Formally, this means that for each pair of alternatives a and b such that the first voter along
the order L prefers a to b and for each two voters v, v′ with v ≻L v′,
b ≻v a implies b ≻v′ a.
To characterize single-crossing profiles, we need the following two configurations.
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Definition 8 (γ-configuration).
A profile with three voters v1, v2, v3, and six (not necessarily distinct) alternatives a, b, c, d, e, f
is a γ-configuration, if it satisfies the following:
voter v1 : b ≻ a and c ≻ d and e ≻ f ,
voter v2 : a ≻ b and d ≻ c and e ≻ f ,
voter v3 : a ≻ b and c ≻ d and f ≻ e.
The γ-configuration describes a situation where each voter disagrees with the other two
voters on the order of exactly two distinct alternatives. The profile is not single-crossing as
none of the three voters can be put between the other two: The pair {a, b} prevents us from
putting v1 in the middle, the pair {c, d} forbids voter v2 in the middle, and the pair {e, f}
forbids v3 in the middle.
Definition 9 (δ-configuration).
A profile with four voters v1, v2, v3, v4, and four (not necessarily distinct) alternatives a, b, c, d
is a δ-configuration, if it satisfies the following:
voter v1 : a ≻ b and c ≻ d,
voter v2 : a ≻ b and d ≻ c,
voter v3 : b ≻ a and c ≻ d,
voter v4 : b ≻ a and d ≻ c.
The δ-configuration shows a different kind of voter behavior: Two voters disagree with
the other two voters on the order of two alternatives, but also disagree between each other
on the order of two further alternatives. This profile is not single-crossing as the pair {a, b}
forces us to place v1 and v2 next to each other, and to put v3 and v4 next to each other; the
pair {c, d} forces us to place v1 and v3 next to each other, and to put v2 and v4 next to each
other. This means that no voter can be placed in the first position.
A profile is single-crossing if and only if it contains neither γ-configurations nor δ-
configurations [12].
2.5 Two central problems
As already discussed before, two natural ways of measuring the closeness of profiles to some
restricted domains are to count the number of voters resp. alternatives which have to be
deleted to make a profile single-crossing. Hence, for Π∈{worst-restricted, medium-restricted,
best-restricted, value-restricted, single-peaked, single-caved, single-crossing, group-separable,
β-restricted}, we study the following two decision problems: Π Maverick Deletion and
Π Alternative Deletion.
Π Maverick Deletion
Input: A profile with n voters and a non-negative integer k ≤ n.
Question: Can we delete at most k voters so that the resulting profile satisfies the
Π-property?
Π Alternative Deletion
Input: A profile with m alternatives and a non-negative integer k ≤ m.
Question: Can we delete at most k alternatives so that the resulting profile satisfies
the Π-property?
An upper bound for the computational complexity of Π Maverick Deletion and Π Al-
ternative Deletion is easy to see. Both problems are contained in NP for each property Π
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we study: Given a preference profile one can check in polynomial time whether it has prop-
erty Π since Π is characterized by a finite set of forbidden finite substructures. Thus, in order
to show NP-completeness of Π Maverick Deletion and Π Alternative Deletion, we
only have to show their NP-hardness.
3 Value-restricted properties
In this section, we show NP-hardness for the value-restricted, best-restricted, worst-restricted,
and medium-restricted domains, respectively. Notably, we show all these results by reducing
from the NP-complete Vertex Cover problem [34].
Vertex Cover
Input: An undirected graph G = (U,E) and a non-negative integer k ≤ |U |.
Question: Is there a vertex cover U ′ ⊆ U of at most k vertices, that is, |U ′| ≤ k and
∀e ∈ E : e ∩ U ′ 6= ∅?
In every reduction from Vertex Cover we describe, the vertex cover size k coincides with
the maximum number k of voters (resp. alternatives) to delete. Hence, we use the same
variable name.
We first deal with the case of maverick voter deletion (Section 3.1) and then, with the
case of deleting alternatives (Section 3.2). In both cases, the general idea is to transform
every edge of a given graph into an appropriate forbidden configuration.
3.1 Maverick Voter Deletion
Theorem 1. Value-Restricted Maverick Deletion is NP-complete.
Proof. We provide a polynomial-time reduction from Vertex Cover to show NP-hardness.
We will present an example (see Figure 2) for the reduction right after this proof.
Let (G = (U,E), k) denote a Vertex Cover instance with vertex set U = {u1, . . . , ur}
and edge set E = {e1, . . . , es}; without loss of generality we assume that the input graph G
is connected and that graph G has at least four vertices, that is, r ≥ 4, and that k ≤ r − 3.
The set of alternatives consists of three edge alternatives aj , bj, and cj for each edge ej ∈
E. For each vertex in U , we construct one voter. That is, we define A := {aj, bj , cj | ej ∈ E}
and V := {vi | ui ∈ U}. In total, the number m of alternatives is 3s and the number n of
voters is r.
Now we specify the preference order of each voter. Every voter prefers {aj , bj, cj} to {aj′ ,
bj′ , cj′} whenever j < j′. For each edge ej with two incident vertices ui and ui′ , i < i′, and
for each non-incident vertex ui′′ /∈ ej, the following holds:
voter vi : cj ≻ aj ≻ bj ,
voter vi′ : bj ≻ cj ≻ aj ,
voter vi′′ : aj ≻ bj ≻ cj .
In this way, the two vertex voters that correspond to the vertices in ej and any voter vz not
in ej form a cyclic configuration with regard to the three edge alternatives aj , bj , and cj . By
the definition of cyclic configurations, this configuration is also best-diverse, medium-diverse,
and worst-diverse.
The maximum number of voters to delete equals the maximum vertex cover size k. This
completes the construction which can be done in polynomial time.
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u1
u2
u3u4
u5
e1
e2
e3
e4
(a)
voter v1 : c1≻a1≻b1≻a2≻b2≻c2≻a3≻b3≻c3≻a4≻b4≻c4
voter v2 : b1≻c1≻a1≻c2≻a2≻b2≻a3≻b3≻c3≻a4≻b4≻c4
voter v3 : a1≻b1≻c1≻b2≻c2≻a2≻c3≻a3≻b3≻a4≻b4≻c4
voter v4 : a1≻b1≻c1≻a2≻b2≻c2≻b3≻c3≻a3≻c4≻a4≻b4
voter v5 : a1≻b1≻c1≻a2≻b2≻c2≻a3≻b3≻c3≻b4≻c4≻a4
(b)
Figure 2: (a) An undirected graph with 5 vertices and 4 edges. The graph has a vertex
cover of size 2 (filled in gray). (b) A reduced instance ((A, V ), k = 2) of Value-Restricted
Maverick Deletion, where A = {ai, bi, ci | 1 ≤ i ≤ 4} and V = {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5}.
Deleting v2 and v4 results in a value-restricted profile. In fact, the resulting profile is also
best-restricted, single-peaked (and hence worst-restricted), and group-separable (and hence
medium-restricted).
It remains to show its correctness. In particular, we show that (G = (U,E), k) has a vertex
cover of size at most k if and only if the constructed profile can be made value-restricted by
deleting at most k voters.
For the “only if” part, suppose that U ′ ⊆ U with |U ′| ≤ k is a vertex cover. We show
that, after deleting the voters corresponding to the vertices in U ′ the resulting profile is
value-restricted. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that the resulting profile is not value-
restricted. That is, it still contains a cyclic configuration σ. By the definition of cyclic
configurations, it must hold that for each pair of alternatives x and y in σ, there are two
voters, one preferring x to y and the other preferring y to x. Together with the fact that
all voters agree on the relative order of two edge alternatives that correspond to different
edges, this implies that the three alternatives aj , bj, and cj in σ correspond to the same
edge ej. Furthermore, σ involves two voters corresponding to the incident vertices from ej,
and one other voter, because all voters corresponding to vertices not in ej have the same
ranking aj ≻ bj ≻ cj . Then, edge ej is not covered by any vertex in U ′—a contradiction.
For the “if” part, suppose that the profile becomes value-restricted after the removal of
a subset V ′ ⊆ V of voters with |V ′| ≤ k. That is, no three remaining voters form a cyclic
configuration. We show by contradiction that V ′ corresponds to a vertex cover of graph G.
Assume towards a contradiction that an edge ej is not covered by the vertices corresponding
to the voters in V ′. Then, the two voters corresponding to the vertices that are incident
with edge ej together with a third voter form a cyclic configuration with regard to the three
alternatives aj , bj and cj—a contradiction. Thus, V
′ corresponds to a vertex cover of graphG
and its size is at most k.
We illustrate our reduction through an example. Figure 2(a) depicts an undirected graph
with 5 vertices and 4 edges. Vertices u2 and u4 form a vertex cover of size two. Figure 2(b)
shows the reduced instance with 5 voters and 3 · 4 = 12 alternatives. Deleting voters v2
and v4 results in a value-restricted profile which is also best-restricted, single-peaked (and
hence worst-restricted), and group-separable (and hence medium-restricted).
Taking a closer look at the reduction shown in the proof of Theorem 1, the constructed
profile contains cyclic configurations which are simultaneously best-diverse, worst-diverse,
and medium-diverse. It turns out that we can use the same construction to show the following
three NP-hardness results with regard to the best-restricted, worst-restricted, and medium-
restricted properties.
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Proposition 1. Π Maverick Deletion is NP-complete for every property Π ∈ {best-
restricted, worst-restricted, medium-restricted}.
Proof. Let (G = (U,E), k) be a Vertex Cover instance and let A and V be the set of
alternatives and the set of voters that are constructed in the same way as in the proof of
Theorem 1. Let k be the number of voters to be deleted. As we already observed in that
proof, for each edge ej ∈ E, the two vertex voters that correspond to the vertices in ej
and any other voter vz form a cyclic configuration, that is, a best-diverse, worst-diverse,
and medium-diverse configuration. It remains to show that (G = (U,E), k) has a vertex
cover of size at most k if and only if the constructed profile can be made best-restricted (or
worst-restricted or medium-restricted) by deleting at most k voters.
For the “if” part, suppose that the profile becomes best-restricted (or worst-restricted or
medium-restricted) by deleting a subset V ′ ⊆ V of voters with |V ′| ≤ k. Then, the resulting
profile is also value-restricted. Thus, we can use the “if” part in the proof of Theorem 1 and
obtain that the vertices corresponding to V ′ form a vertex cover of size at most k.
For the “only if” part, suppose that U ′ ⊆ U with |U ′| ≤ k is a vertex cover. As in the
“only if” part proof of Theorem 1, we can show that deleting the voters corresponding to U ′
results in a best-restricted and a worst-restricted profile.
As for the medium-restricted property, suppose towards a contradiction that after deleting
the voters corresponding to the vertices in U ′ there is still a medium-diverse configuration σ.
By the definition of medium-diverse configurations, we know that in σ, each alternative is
ranked between the other two by one voter. This implies that σ involves three alternatives
that correspond to the same edge ej and involves two voters that correspond to ej ’s incident
vertices. Thus, ej is an uncovered edge—a contradiction.
3.2 Alternative Deletion
Next, we consider the case of deleting alternatives. Just as for the voter deletion case, we first
show NP-hardness of deciding the distance to value-restricted profiles. Then, we show how to
adapt the reduction to also work for deciding the distance to best-restricted, worst-restricted,
and medium-restricted profiles, respectively.
Theorem 2. Value-Restricted Alternative Deletion is NP-complete.
Proof. We reduce from Vertex Cover to Value-Restricted Alternative Deletion.
Let (G = (U,E), k) denote a Vertex Cover instance with vertex set U = {u1, . . . , ur} and
edge set E = {e1, . . . , es}. The set of alternatives consists of one vertex alternative aj for
each vertex uj in U and of k + 1 additional dummy alternatives. Let A denote the set of
all vertex alternatives and let D denote the set of all dummy alternatives. We arbitrarily
fix a canonical order 〈D〉 of D and we set 〈A〉 := a1 ≻ a2 ≻ . . . ≻ ar. The number m of
constructed alternatives is r + k + 1.
We introduce a voter v0 with the canonical preference order 〈D〉 ≻ 〈A〉. For each edge ei =
{uj, uj′} with j < j
′, we introduce two edge voters v2i−1 and v2i with preference orders
voter v2i−1 : aj ≻ aj′ ≻ 〈D〉 ≻ 〈A \ {aj, aj′}〉,
voter v2i : aj′ ≻ 〈D〉 ≻ 〈A \ {aj′}〉.
Together with voter v0, the two voters v2i−1 and v2i form a cyclic configuration with respect
to the two vertex alternatives aj , aj′ and an arbitrary dummy alternative from D. Let V
denote the set of all voters. In total, the number n of constructed voters is 2s + 1. The
maximum number of alternatives to delete equals the maximum vertex cover size k. This
completes the construction.
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Our reduction runs in polynomial time. It remains to show that graph G has a vertex
cover of size at most k if and only if the constructed profile can be made value-restricted by
deleting at most k alternatives.
For the “only if” part, suppose that U ′ ⊆ U with |U ′| ≤ k is a vertex cover. We
show that after deleting the vertex alternatives corresponding to U ′, the resulting profile
is value-restricted. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that the resulting profile is not
value-restricted, that is, it contains a cyclic configuration σ. By definition, it must hold that
for each pair of alternatives x and y in σ, there are two voters, one preferring x to y and
the other preferring y to x. Together with the fact that each voter agrees on the relative
order of two distinct dummy alternatives, this implies that σ contains at most one dummy
alternative. But if σ contains one dummy alternative d ∈ D, then there is a voter with
preferences aj ≻ aj′ ≻ d where aj, aj′ ∈ A, which means that edge {uj, uj′} is not covered
by U ′. Hence, σ contains no dummy alternative. This means that σ contains three vertex
alternatives aj , aj′ , and aj′′ with j < j
′ < j′′ and by the definition of cyclic configurations,
σ involves three voters with preferences {aj , aj′} ≻ aj′′ , {aj, aj′′} ≻ aj′ , and {aj′ , aj′′} ≻ aj ,
respectively. However, the last preference implies that {uj′ , uj′′} is an edge which is not
covered by U ′—a contradiction.
For the “if” part, suppose that the constructed profile is a yes-instance of Value-
Restricted Alternative Deletion. Let A′ ⊆ A ∪ D be the set of deleted vertex al-
ternatives with |A′| ≤ k. We show that the vertex set U ′ corresponding to A′ form a vertex
cover of graph G and has size at most k. Clearly, |U ′| ≤ k. Assume towards a contradiction
that ei = {uj, uj′}, j < j′, is not covered by U ′. Since |D| > k, at least one dummy alterna-
tive d is not deleted. Then, v0 and the two edge voters v2i−1, v2i form a cyclic configuration
with regard to aj , aj′ , d—a contradiction.
Using the same construction as in the last proof, we can show that achieving best-
restriction, worst-restriction, or medium-restriction via deleting the fewest number of al-
ternatives is intractable.
Proposition 2. Π Alternative Deletion is NP-complete for every property Π ∈ {best-
restricted, worst-restricted, medium-restricted}.
Proof. Let ((U,E), k) denote a Vertex Cover instance with vertex set U = {u1, . . . , ur}
and edge set E = {e1, . . . , es}. Let A, D, and V be the sets constructed in the same way as
in the proof of Theorem 2.
It remains to show that ((U,E), k) has a vertex cover of size at most k if and only if the
constructed profile can be made best-restricted (or worst-restricted or medium-restricted) by
deleting at most k alternatives.
For the “if” part, suppose that the profile becomes best-restricted (or worst-restricted
or medium-restricted) after deleting a set A′ ⊆ A ∪ D of at most k alternatives. Then,
the resulting profile is also value-restricted. Thus, we can use the “if” part in the proof
of Theorem 2 and obtain that the vertices corresponding to A′ form a vertex set of size at
most k.
For the “only if” part, suppose that U ′ ⊆ U with |U ′| ≤ k is a vertex cover. Just as in the
“only if” part proof of Theorem 2, we can show that deleting the alternatives corresponding
to U ′ results in a best-restricted and a worst-restricted profile.
Now, we consider the medium-restricted property. Suppose for the sake of contradiction
that the resulting profile is not medium-restricted, that is, it contains a medium-diverse
configuration σ. Since all voters rank 〈D〉 and since no voter rank d ≻ aj ≻ d′ with d, d′ ∈ D
and aj ∈ A, configuration σ contains at most one dummy alternative. Now, if σ involves one
dummy alternative d ∈ D and two vertex alternatives aj , aj′ ∈ A with j < j′, then the voter
ranking aj′ between aj and d must rank aj ≻ aj′ ≻ d. But this means that edge {uj, uj′}
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is uncovered—a contradiction. Hence, σ contains no dummy alternative. This means that σ
involves three vertex alternatives aj , aj′ , aj′′ with j < j
′ < j′′. By the definition of medium-
diverse configurations, σ must contain a voter that ranks aj′′ between aj and aj′ , that is,
a voter ranks either aj ≻ aj′′ ≻ aj′ or aj′ ≻ aj′′ ≻ aj . This, however, implies that either
edge {uj, uj′′} or edge {uj′ , uj′′} is uncovered–a contradiction.
4 Single-peaked, single-caved, and group-separable prop-
erties
Since single-peaked, group-separable, and single-caved profiles are necessarily worst-restricted,
medium-restricted, and best-restricted, respectively, it seems reasonable to expect that the
intractability result (Proposition 1) transfers. Indeed, we can show that this immediately
follows from the proofs of Proposition 1 (and hence of Theorem 1) because the profile con-
structed in the NP-hardness reduction contains neither α-configurations, nor β-configurations,
nor α¯-configurations. Note that NP-hardness of Single-Peaked Maverick Deletion is
already known by a different proof of Erde´lyi et al. [29]. However, their proof does not work
for Π Maverick Deletion with Π ∈ {best-restricted, medium-restricted, worst-restricted,
group-separable}.
Corollary 1. ΠMaverick Deletion is NP-complete for every property Π ∈ {single-peaked,
single-caved, group-separable}.
Proof. First, the profile constructed in the proof of Proposition 1 does not contain any three
alternatives x, y, and z such that there is one voter with x ≻ y ≻ z and one voter with
z ≻ y ≻ x. Thus, the profile does not contain any α-configuration or any α¯-configuration.
Second, one can partition every set T of four alternatives into two non-empty subsets T1
and T2 such that T1 ≻ T2 holds for each voter because at most three alternatives can cor-
respond to the same edge and all voters have the same ranking over the alternatives that
correspond to different edges. However, this is not possible in a β-configuration. Thus, the
profile does not contain any α-configuration, α¯-configuration, or β-configuration.
As a consequence, the reduction in the proof of Proposition 1 also works for Single-
Peaked Maverick Deletion, Single-Crossing Maverick Deletion, and Group-
Separable Maverick Deletion.
Just as the result for the maverick deletion, the NP-hardness result of Medium-Re-
stricted Alternative Deletion also transfers to the group-separable case. After delet-
ing the alternatives corresponding to a vertex cover, the resulting profile from the proof of
Proposition 2 does not contain any β-configurations. Thus, the following holds.
Corollary 2. Group-Separable Alternative Deletion is NP-complete.
Proof. The profile constructed in the proof of Proposition 2 may contain β-configurations,
but we show that destroying all medium-diverse configurations by deleting at most k alter-
natives also destroys all β-configurations. Consider the profile P after the the deletion of
the alternatives. Assume towards a contradiction that profile P contains a β-configuration
which involves four alternatives w, x, y, z and two voters v, v′ with preferences
voter v : w ≻ x ≻ y ≻ z and voter v′ : x ≻ z ≻ w ≻ y.
Observe that a β-configuration may contain at most one dummy alternative, because no
two alternatives appear consecutively in both preference orders of a β-configuration, but all
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dummy alternatives appear consecutively in all preference orders of the profile P . Further-
more, w, y, and z are vertex alternatives since in P , no voter prefers more than one vertex
alternative to a dummy alternative. Then by the definition of β-configurations, we have that
voter v ranks aj ≻ x ≻ aj′ ≻ aj′′ and voter v′ ranks x ≻ aj′′ ≻ aj ≻ aj′ with aj , aj′ , aj′′ ∈ A.
However, the preference order of voter v implies that j′ < j′′ and the preference order of
voter v′ implies that j′′ < j′—a contradiction. As consequence, the reduction in the proof of
Proposition 2 also works for Group-Separable Maverick Deletion.
In order to be group-separable, a preference profile must be medium-restricted and β-
restricted. As already shown in Corollary 1 and in Corollary 2, deleting as few maverick voters
(or alternatives) as possible to obtain the group-separable property is NP-hard. Alternatively,
we can also derive this intractability result from the following two theorems.
Theorem 3. β-Restricted Maverick Deletion is NP-complete.
Proof. We reduce from Vertex Cover to show NP-hardness. Let (G = (U,E), k) denote
a Vertex Cover instance with vertex set U = {u1, . . . , ur} and edge set E = {e1, . . . , es};
without loss of generality we assume that the input graph G is connected and that it has
at least four vertices, that is, r ≥ 4. The set of alternatives consists of four edge alterna-
tives aj , bj, cj , dj for each edge ej ∈ E. For each vertex in U , we construct one voter. That
is, we define A := {aj, bj, cj , dj | ej ∈ E} and V := {vi | ui ∈ U}. In total, the number m of
alternatives is 4s and the number n of voters is r.
Now we specify the preference order of each voter. Every voter prefers {aj, bj, cj , dj} to
{aj′ , bj′ , cj′ , dj′} whenever j < j′. For each edge ej with two incident vertices ui and ui′ ,
i < i′, and for each non-incident vertex ui′′ /∈ ej , the following holds:
voter vi : aj ≻ bj ≻ cj ≻ dj ,
voter vi′ : bj ≻ dj ≻ aj ≻ cj ,
voter vi′′ : dj ≻ aj ≻ bj ≻ cj ,
In this way, any β-configuration regarding alternatives aj , bj, cj , dj must involve voters vi and
vi′ . The maximum number of voters to delete equals the maximum vertex cover size k. This
completes the construction.
Clearly, the whole construction runs in polynomial time. It remains to show that (G =
(U,E), k) has a vertex cover of size at most k if and only if the constructed profile can be
made β-restricted by deleting at most k voters.
For the “only if” part, suppose that U ′ ⊆ U with |U ′| ≤ k is a vertex cover. We
show that after deleting the voters corresponding to the vertices in U ′ the resulting profile
is β-restricted. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that the resulting profile is not β-
restricted. That is, it still contains a β-configuration σ. Since all voters prefer {aj, bj , cj , dj}
to {aj′ , bj′ , cj′′ , dj′′′} whenever j < j′, the profile restricted to every four alternatives that
correspond to at least two edges, is group-separable. But since σ is not group-separable, σ
involves four alternatives aj , bj , cj , and dj that correspond to a single edge ej . As already
observed, any β-configuration regarding alternatives aj , bj, cj , dj must involve voters vi and
vi′ that correspond to both endpoints of ej . Then edge ej is not covered by any vertex
in U ′—a contradiction.
For the “if” part, suppose that the profile becomes β-restricted by deleting a subset V ′ ⊆
V of voters with |V ′| ≤ k. That is, no two voters form a β-configuration. We show by
contradiction that V ′ corresponds to a vertex cover of graph G and has size at most k.
Clearly, |V ′| ≤ k. Assume towards a contradiction that an edge ej is not covered by the
vertices corresponding to the voters in V ′. Then, the two voters corresponding to the vertices
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that are incident with edge ej form a β-configuration with regard to aj , bj , cj , and dj—a
contradiction. Thus, V ′ corresponds to a vertex cover of graph G and its size is at most
k.
Theorem 4. β-Restricted Alternative Deletion is NP-complete.
Proof. We reduce from Vertex Cover to β-Restricted Alternative Deletion. Let
(G = (U,E), k) denote a Vertex Cover instance with vertex set U = {u1, . . . , ur} and
edge set E = {e1, . . . , es}; without loss of generality we assume that the input graph G is
connected and that r ≥ k + 2. The set of alternatives consists of one vertex alternative aj
and one dummy alternative dj for each vertex uj in U . Let A denote the set of all vertex
alternatives and letD denote the set of all dummy alternatives. The numberm of constructed
alternatives is 2r.
We fix the canonical order of A ∪D to be
〈A ∪D〉 := d1 ≻ a1 ≻ d2 ≻ a2 ≻ . . . ≻ dr ≻ ar.
We introduce a voter v0 with the preference order 〈A∪D〉. For each edge ei = {uj, uj′} with
j < j′, we introduce one edge voter vi with preference order
aj ≻ aj′ ≻ 〈A ∪D \ {aj, aj′}〉.
Observe that voter v0 and vi form a β-configuration with respect to the four alternatives
corresponding to the vertices in edge {uj, uj′} with j < j′, that is, with respect to aj , aj′ ,
dj , and dj′ .
voter v0 : dj ≻ aj ≻ dj′ ≻ aj′ ,
voter vi : aj ≻ aj′ ≻ dj ≻ dj′ .
Furthermore, for each pair of alternatives a and b, if there is a voter v preferring a to b, then
the following holds:
(i) If neither a nor b is in the first two positions of voter v’s preference order, then a and
b correspond to two (not necessarily distinct) vertices uj and uj′ with j ≤ j′.
(ii) If a and b correspond to two vertices uj and uj′ with j > j
′ and if there is a third
alternative c such that v prefers c to a, then c and a correspond to two adjacent
vertices.
We will utilize these two facts several times to show some contradictions.
Let V denote the set of all voters. In total, the number n of constructed voters is s+ 1.
The maximum number of alternatives to delete equals the maximum vertex cover size k.
This completes the construction.
Our construction runs in polynomial time. It remains to show that (G = (U,E), k) has a
vertex cover of size at most k if and only if the constructed profile can be made β-restricted
by deleting at most k alternatives.
For the “only if” part, suppose that U ′ ⊆ U with |U ′| ≤ k is a vertex cover of graph G.
We show that after deleting the vertex alternatives corresponding to U ′, denoted by A′,
the resulting profile is β-restricted. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that the resulting
profile still contains a β-configuration σ with regard to four alternatives w, x, y, z and two
voters v, v′ with preferences
voter v : w ≻ x ≻ y ≻ z and voter v′ : x ≻ z ≻ w ≻ y.
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Let w, x, y, z correspond to four non-deleted vertices uj, uj′ , uj′′ , uj′′′ , respectively. By
Property (i), the preference order of voter v implies that j′′ ≤ j′′′ (note that voter v ranks
neither y nor z in the first two positions) and the preference order of voter v′ implies that
j ≤ j′′ (note that voter v′ ranks neither w nor y in the first two positions). Since x, y,
and z correspond to at least two distinct vertices, it follows that j < j′′′. Since voter v′
rank x ≻ z ≻ w ≻ y, by Property (ii) the inequality j < j′′′ implies that uj′ and uj′′′
are adjacent—a contradiction to U ′ being a vertex cover. Indeed, the resulting profile is
group-separable. To see this, note that any size-at-least-three subset T ⊆ (A ∪ D) \ A′ of
alternatives can be partitioned into two non-empty subsets {a} and T \ {a} with a being the
last alternative in the canonical order restricted to the alternatives in set T .
For “if” part, suppose that the constructed profile is a yes-instance of β-Restricted
Alternative Deletion. Let A′ ⊆ A ∪D be the set of deleted alternatives with |A′| ≤ k.
Consider the vertex set U ′ containing all vertices corresponding to a vertex alternative or to
a dummy alternative in A′, that is, U ′ := {uj | aj ∈ A′ ∨ dj ∈ A′}. Obviously, |U ′| ≤ k. We
show that set U ′ is a vertex cover. Suppose towards a contradiction that there is an uncovered
edge ei = {uj, uj′} with j < j′. By the definition of U ′, we have that A′∩{dj , aj , dj′ , aj′} = ∅.
Then, voters v0 and vi form a β-configuration with respect to the alternatives dj , aj, dj′ , aj′—
a contradiction.
5 Single-crossing properties
In this section, we show that for the single-crossing property, the alternative deletion prob-
lem is NP-hard while the maverick deletion problem is polynomial-time solvable. The NP-
hardness proof is based on the following NP-complete Maximum 2-Satisfiability prob-
lem [34].
Maximum 2-Satisfiability (Max2Sat)
Input: A set U of Boolean variables, a collection C of size-two clauses over U and a
positive integer h.
Question: Is there a truth assignment for U such that at least h clauses in C are
satisfied?
Theorem 5. Single-Crossing Alternative Deletion is NP-complete.
Proof. For the NP-hardness result we reduce fromMax2Sat [34]. We will provide an example
for the reduction (Table 2) right after this proof.
Let (U,C, h) be a Max2Sat instance with variable set U = {x1, . . . , xr} and clause
set C = {c1, . . . , cs}. We construct two sets O and O of dummy alternatives with |O| =
|O| = 2(r · s + r + s) + 1 . For each variable xi ∈ U , we construct two sets Xi and Xi
of variable alternatives with |Xi| = |Xi| = s + 1. We say that Xi corresponds to xi and
that Xi corresponds to xi. The canonical orders 〈O〉, 〈O〉, 〈Xi〉 and 〈Xi〉, i ∈ {1, . . . , r},
are arbitrary but fixed. Let X be the union
⋃r
i=1Xi ∪Xi of all variable alternatives. The
canonical order 〈X〉 is defined as
〈X〉 := 〈X1〉 ≻ 〈X1〉 ≻ 〈X2〉 ≻ 〈X2〉 ≻ . . . ≻ 〈Xr〉 ≻ 〈Xr〉.
For each clause cj ∈ C, we construct two clause alternatives aj and bj . Let A denote the set
of all clause alternatives. The canonical order 〈A〉 is defined as
〈A〉 := a1 ≻ b1 ≻ a2 ≻ b2 ≻ . . . ≻ as ≻ bs.
The total number m of alternatives is 6(r · s+ r + s) + 2.
We will introduce voters and their preference orders such that
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(1) deleting all alternatives in Xi corresponds to setting variable xi to true,
(2) deleting all alternatives in Xi corresponds to setting variable xi to false, and
(3) deleting bj or aj corresponds to clause cj not being satisfied.
We construct two sets V and W of voters with |V | = 2r and |W | = 4s. Voter set V consists
of two voters v2i−1 and v2i for each variable xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Their preference orders are
〈O〉 ≻ 〈O〉 ≻ 〈X1〉 ≻ 〈X1〉 ≻ . . . ≻ 〈Xi−1〉 ≻ 〈Xi−1〉 ≻
〈Xi〉 ≻ 〈Xi〉 ≻ 〈Xi+1〉 ≻ 〈Xi+1〉 ≻ . . . ≻ 〈Xr〉 ≻ 〈Xr〉 ≻ 〈A〉,
〈O〉 ≻ 〈O〉 ≻ 〈X1〉 ≻ 〈X1〉 ≻ . . . ≻ 〈Xi−1〉 ≻ 〈Xi−1〉 ≻
〈Xi〉 ≻ 〈Xi〉 ≻ 〈Xi+1〉 ≻ 〈Xi+1〉 ≻ . . . ≻ 〈Xr〉 ≻ 〈Xr〉 ≻ 〈A〉,
respectively. These two voters together with any other two voters vℓ and vℓ′ ∈ V \{v2i−1, v2i}
with odd number ℓ and even number ℓ′ form a δ-configuration with regard to each four
alternatives o, o, x, x such that o ∈ O, o ∈ O, x ∈ Xi, x ∈ Xi:
voter v2i−1 : o ≻ o and x ≻ x,
voter v2i : o ≻ o and x ≻ x,
voter vℓ : o ≻ o and x ≻ x,
voter vℓ′ : o ≻ o and x ≻ x.
Voter set W consists of four voters w4j−3, w4j−2, w4j−1, w4j for each clause cj , 1 ≤ j ≤ s.
These four voters have the same preference order
〈O〉 ≻ 〈O〉 ≻ 〈A1〉 ≻ 〈X〉 ≻ 〈A2〉
over the setO∪O∪A1∪A2∪X , whereA1 = {aj′ , bj′ | j′ < j} andA2 = {aj′ , bj′ | j′ > j}. Note
that A1∪A2 = A\{aj , bj}. Thus, it remains to specify the exact positions of aj and bj in the
four voters’ preference orders: Let X̂j1 denote the set of variable alternatives corresponding
to the literal in cj with the lower index and X̂
j
2 denote the set of variable alternatives
corresponding to the literal in cj with the higher index. For instance, if cj = x2 ∨ x4, then
X̂j1 equals X2 and X̂
j
2 equals X4.
Voters w4j−3 and w4j−2 rank the clause alternative aj right below the last alternative in
〈X̂j1〉 while voters w4j−1 and w4j rank it right above the first alternative in 〈X̂
j
1〉. As for
alternative bj , voters w4j−3 and w4j−1 rank bj right above the first variable alternative in
〈X̂j2〉 while voters w4j−2 and w4j rank it right below the last variable alternative in 〈X̂
j
2〉.
Thus, these four voters form a δ-configuration with regard to aj , bj , x ∈ X̂
j
1 , and y ∈ X̂
j
2 :
voter w4j−3 : x ≻ aj and bj ≻ y,
voter w4j−2 : x ≻ aj and y ≻ bj,
voter w4j−1 : aj ≻ x and bj ≻ y,
voter w4j : aj ≻ x and y ≻ bj.
We complete the construction by setting the number k of alternatives that may be deleted
to k := r(s+ 1) + (s− h).
The construction clearly runs in polynomial time. It remains to show that (U,C, h) is
a yes-instance of Max2Sat if and only if the constructed profile together with k is a yes-
instance of Single-Crossing Alternative Deletion.
17
For the “only if” part, suppose that there is a truth assignment U → {true, false}r of the
variables such that at least h clauses are satisfied. We delete all variable alternatives in Xi if
xi is assigned to true. Otherwise, we delete all variable alternatives in Xi. Furthermore, we
delete the clause alternative bj if cj is not satisfied by the assignment. Let Xrem be the set
of remaining variable alternatives, and let Arem be the set of remaining clause alternatives.
Then, |Xrem| = r(s + 1) and |A′| ≥ s + h, implying that the number of deleted alternatives
is |X |+ |A| − (|Xrem|+ |Arem|) ≤ r(s + 1) + (s− h) = k.
For each j ∈ {1, . . . , s}, we define 〈zj〉 = w4j−2 ≻ w4j ≻ w4j−3 ≻ w4j−1 if the literal in
clause cj with the lower index is satisfied; otherwise, 〈zj〉 = w4j−3 ≻ w4j−2 ≻ w4j−1 ≻ w4j .
The resulting profile is single-crossing with respect to the voter order L:
v1 ≻ v3 ≻ . . . ≻ v2r−1 ≻ v2 ≻ v4 ≻ . . . ≻ v2r ≻ 〈z1〉 ≻ 〈z2〉 ≻ . . . ≻ 〈zs〉.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that L is not a single-crossing order, which means
that there is a pair {a, a′} ⊂ O ∪ O ∪ Xrem ∪ Arem of alternatives and three voters u, v, w
with u ≻L v ≻L w such that voter v disagrees with voters u and w on the relative order of a
and a′.
Note that all voters along L up to and including voter v2r−1 rank 〈O〉 ≻ 〈O〉 ≻ 〈X〉 while
all voters from v2 onwards rank 〈O〉 ≻ 〈O〉 ≻ 〈X〉. Hence, a and a′ can neither both be in
O ∪ O, nor both be in Xrem. Furthermore, a and a′ cannot both be in Arem as all voters
rank 〈A〉. Moreover, since all voters rank (O ∪ O) ≻ (X ∪ A), neither a nor a′ belongs to
O ∪O. This means, without loss of generality, that a ∈ Xrem and a′ ∈ Arem.
Assume that a′ corresponds to clause cj for some j, that is, a
′ ∈ {aj, bj}. Then, for each
alternative a′′ ∈ Xrem \ (X̂
j
1 ∪ X̂
j
2) that does not correspond to a literal in cj (recall that X̂
j
1
and X̂j2 denote the two sets of variable alternatives corresponding to the literal in cj with
the lower index and the literal in cj with the lower index, respectively), the following holds.
If the first voter in 〈zj〉 prefer a′′ to a′, which means either that a′′ is ranked in front of
X̂j1 ∪ X̂
j
2 (by all voters) or that a
′ = aj and a
′′ is ranked in front of X̂j2 (by all voters), then
all voters along the order L up to and including the last voter in 〈zj〉 prefer a′′ to a′ while all
remaining voters prefer a′ to a′′; otherwise all voters along the order L up to and including
the last voter in 〈zj−1〉 prefer a′′ to a′ while all remaining voters prefer a′ to a′′. Thus, a′
cannot be in Xrem \ (X̂
j
1 ∪ X̂
j
2). That is, we have a ∈ X̂
j
1 ∪ X̂
j
2 . We distinguish four cases
regarding a and a′.
(i) If a ∈ X̂j1 and if a
′ = aj , then the literal corresponding to X̂
j
1 is not satisfied because
X̂j1 is not deleted. Thus, 〈zj〉 is defined as w4j−3 ≻ w4j−2 ≻ w4j−1 ≻ w4j . All voters
along L up to and including w4j−2 prefer a to a
′, and all remaining voters prefer a′
to a.
(ii) If a ∈ X̂j1 and if a
′ = bj , then all voters along L up to and including the last voter
in 〈zj〉 prefer a to a′, and all remaining voters prefer a′ to a.
(iii) If a ∈ X̂j2 and if a
′ = aj, then all voters along L up to and including the last voter
in 〈zj−1〉 prefer a to a′, and all remaining voters a′ to a.
(iv) If a ∈ X̂j2 and if a
′ = bj, then clause cj is satisfied because bj is not deleted. Furthermore,
since X̂j2 is not deleted, X̂
j
1 must be deleted because clause cj is satisfied. This implies
that the literal in clause cj with the lower index is satisfied. Thus, 〈zj〉 is defined as
w4j−2 ≻ w4j ≻ w4j−3 ≻ w4j−1. All voters along L up to and including w4j prefer a
to a′, and all remaining voters prefer a′ to a.
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voter v1 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻〈X1〉≻〈X1〉≻〈X2〉≻〈X2〉≻a1≻b1≻a2≻b2≻a3≻b3≻a4≻b4
voter v2 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻〈X1〉≻〈X1〉≻〈X2〉≻〈X2〉≻a1≻b1≻a2≻b2≻a3≻b3≻a4≻b4
voter v3 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻〈X1〉≻〈X1〉≻〈X2〉≻〈X2〉≻a1≻b1≻a2≻b2≻a3≻b3≻a4≻b4
voter v4 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻〈X1〉≻〈X1〉≻〈X2〉≻〈X2〉≻a1≻b1≻a2≻b2≻a3≻b3≻a4≻b4
voter w1 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻〈X1〉≻a1≻〈X1〉≻b1≻〈X2〉≻〈X2〉≻a2≻b2≻a3≻b3≻a4≻b4
voter w2 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻〈X1〉≻a1≻〈X1〉≻〈X2〉≻b1≻〈X2〉≻a2≻b2≻a3≻b3≻a4≻b4
voter w3 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻a1≻〈X1〉≻〈X1〉≻b1≻〈X2〉≻〈X2〉≻a2≻b2≻a3≻b3≻a4≻b4
voter w4 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻a1≻〈X1〉≻〈X1〉≻〈X2〉≻b1≻〈X2〉≻a2≻b2≻a3≻b3≻a4≻b4
voter w5 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻a1≻b1≻〈X1〉≻a2≻〈X1〉≻〈X2〉≻b2≻〈X2〉≻a3≻b3≻a4≻b4
voter w6 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻a1≻b1≻〈X1〉≻a2≻〈X1〉≻〈X2〉≻〈X2〉≻b2≻a3≻b3≻a4≻b4
voter w7 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻a1≻b1≻a2≻〈X1〉≻〈X1〉≻〈X2〉≻b2≻〈X2〉≻a3≻b3≻a4≻b4
voter w8 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻a1≻b1≻a2≻〈X1〉≻〈X1〉≻〈X2〉≻〈X2〉≻b2≻a3≻b3≻a4≻b4
voter w9 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻a1≻b1≻a2≻b2≻〈X1〉≻〈X1〉≻a3≻b3≻〈X2〉≻〈X2〉≻a4≻b4
voter w10 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻a1≻b1≻a2≻b2≻〈X1〉≻〈X1〉≻a3≻〈X2〉≻b3≻〈X2〉≻a4≻b4
voter w11 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻a1≻b1≻a2≻b2≻〈X1〉≻a3≻〈X1〉≻b3≻〈X2〉≻〈X2〉≻a4≻b4
voter w12 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻a1≻b1≻a2≻b2≻〈X1〉≻a3≻〈X1〉≻〈X2〉≻b3≻〈X2〉≻a4≻b4
voter w13 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻a1≻b1≻a2≻b2≻a3≻b3≻〈X1〉≻〈X1〉≻a4≻〈X2〉≻b4≻〈X2〉
voter w14 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻a1≻b1≻a2≻b2≻a3≻b3≻〈X1〉≻〈X1〉≻a4≻〈X2〉≻〈X2〉≻b4
voter w15 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻a1≻b1≻a2≻b2≻a3≻b3≻〈X1〉≻a4≻〈X1〉≻〈X2〉≻b4≻〈X2〉
voter w16 : 〈O〉≻〈O〉≻a1≻b1≻a2≻b2≻a3≻b3≻〈X1〉≻a4≻〈X1〉≻〈X2〉≻〈X2〉≻b4
Table 2: An instance ((A, V ), k = 11) with alternative set O ∪ O ∪ X1 ∪ X1 ∪ X2 ∪ X2 ∪
{ai, bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ 4} and voter set {vi, w4i−3, w4i−2, w4i−1, w4i | 1 ≤ i ≤ 4} reduced from
the Max2Satinstance with two variables x1 and x2, and with four clauses c1 = x1 ∧ x2,
c2 = x1 ∧ x2, c3 = x1 ∧ x2, and c4 = x1 ∧ x2. The maximum number h of satisfied clauses is
three.
In summary, there is single a voter v along the order L such that all voters up to and including
v have the same preference over {a, a′} and all remaining voters have the same preference
over {a, a′}—a contradiction to the assumption that L is not a single-crossing order.
For the “if” part, suppose that deleting a set K of at most k alternatives makes the
remaining profile single-crossing. Since |O| = |O| ≥ k, at least one pair {o, o} of dummy
alternatives is not deleted, where o ∈ O and o ∈ O. Let Xdel denote the set of all deleted
variable alternatives, and Adel denote the set of all deleted clause alternatives. Clearly,
|Xdel| + |Adel| ≤ |K|. For each xi ∈ U , at least one set of Xi and Xi must be deleted
to destroy all δ-configurations involving alternatives in {o, o} ∪ Xi ∪ Xi. This means that
|Xdel| ≥ r(s + 1). Thus, |Adel| ≤ |K| − |Xdel| ≤ k − r(s + 1) ≤ s − h. Let Cboth denote
the set of clauses such that neither aj nor bj is deleted, 1 ≤ j ≤ s, that is, Cboth := {cj |
{aj, bj}∩Adel = ∅}. Set Cboth has cardinality at least h because |Adel| ≤ s−h. We show that
by setting variable xi ∈ U to true if Xi ⊆ Xdel, and false otherwise, all clauses cj from Cboth
are satisfied. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that clause cj ∈ Cboth is not satisfied.
This means that {aj, bj}∩Adel = ∅, and that both X̂
j
1 and X̂
j
2 are not completely contained
in Xdel. But then, voters w4i−3, w4i−2, w4i−1, and w4i form a δ-configuration with regard to
aj, bj , x, x
′ with x ∈ X̂j1 \Xdel and x
′ ∈ X̂j2 \Xdel—a contradiction.
We illustrate our NP-hardness reduction through an example. Consider a Max2Sat in-
stance with two variables x1 and x2 and four clauses c1 = x1 ∧x2, c2 = x1 ∧x2, c3 = x1 ∧x2,
and c4 = x1 ∧ x2. The maximum number h of satisfied clauses is three. For instance,
the truth assignment x1 7→ true and x2 7→ false satisfies clauses c1, c2, c4. Table 2 de-
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picts the reduced instance of Single-Crossing Maverick Deletion with alternative
set O∪O∪X1∪X1∪X2∪X2∪{ai, bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ 4} and voter set {vi, w4i−3, w4i−2, w4i−1, w4i |
1 ≤ i ≤ 4}. The number k of alternatives that may be deleted is set to 2·(4+1)+(4−3) = 11.
We can verify that deleting the alternatives from X1 ∪X2 ∪ {b3} results in a single-crossing
profile where a single-crossing order is v1 ≻ v3 ≻ v2 ≻ v4 ≻ w2 ≻ w4 ≻ w1 ≻ w3 ≻ w6 ≻
w8 ≻ w5 ≻ w7 ≻ w9 ≻ w10 ≻ . . . ≻ w16.
In contrast to the other NP-hard Π Maverick Deletion problems, Single-Crossing
Maverick Deletion is polynomial-time solvable. The algorithm, which is similar to the
single-crossing detection algorithm by Elkind et al. [26], not only solves the decision problem,
but also the optimization problem asking for the maximum-size subset of voters such that
the profile restricted to this subset is single-crossing.
Before we proceed to describe the algorithm, we define some notions and make some
observations about single-crossing profiles. We call a set S of preference orders single-crossing,
if there is a single-crossing order of the elements in S. We introduce the notion ∆(≻,≻′)
of the set of conflict pairs for two given preference orders ≻ and ≻′∈ S. By ∆(≻,≻′), we
denote the set of pairs {a, b} of alternatives whose relative order differs between preference
orders ≻ and ≻′. Formally, ∆(≻,≻′) := {{a, b} | a ≻ b ∧ b ≻′ a}. For instance, given three
alternatives a, b, c, if the preference orders ≻,≻′ are the same, then ∆(v, v′) = ∅; if the two
preference orders are specified as follows:
b ≻ a ≻ c and c ≻′ b ≻′ a,
then ∆(≻,≻′) := {{a, c}, {b, c}}.
Based on this notion, we can redefine the single-crossing property of a set of preference
orders using set inclusions. For the sake of readability, we will use the vector notation (·, · · · , ·)
to denote a linear order over a set of preference orders.
Lemma 1. A linear order (≻∗1,≻
∗
2, . . . ,≻
∗
n) over a set of n preference orders is single-crossing
if and only if for each two preference orders ≻∗i and ≻
∗
j with 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n it holds that
∆(≻∗1,≻
∗
i ) ⊆ ∆(≻
∗
1,≻
∗
j).
Proof. The “only if” part follows directly from the definition of the single-crossing property
and the set of conflict pairs. For the “if” part, suppose towards a contradiction that the
order (≻∗1,≻
∗
2, . . . ,≻
∗
n) is not single-crossing. This means that there are two alternatives a, b,
and there are two preference orders ≻∗i ,≻
∗
j with 1 < i < j such that a ≻
∗
1 b and a ≻
∗
j b, but
b ≻∗i a. Then it follows that {a, b} ∈ ∆(≻
∗
1,≻
∗
i ) but {a, b} /∈ ∆(≻
∗
1,≻
∗
j )—a contradiction.
The following observation states that the single-crossing property only depends on the
preference orders, not on the voters.
Observation 1. Let V be a set of voters and let w /∈ V be an additional voter such that there
is a voter in V who has the same preference order as voter w. Then, the profile with voter
set V is single-crossing if and only if the profile with voter set V ∪ {w} is single-crossing.
Proof. By the definition of single-crossing orders, a profile is single-crossing if and only if
the set of the preference orders of all voters in this profile is single-crossing. Since adding
voter w to voter set V does not change the set of the preference orders of all voters in V , the
statement follows.
Based on the notions of conflicting pairs and single-crossing sets of preference orders, and
Lemma 1 and Observation 1, we can solve the maximization variant of the Single-Crossing
Maverick Deletion problem by reducing it to finding a longest path in an appropriately
constructed directed acyclic graph. This implies the following theorem.
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Theorem 6. Single-Crossing Maverick Deletion is solvable in O(n3 ·m2) time, where
n denotes the number of voters and m denotes the number of alternatives.
Proof. Suppose that we are given a profile with A being the set of m alternatives and V
being the set of n voters, each voter having a preference order over A. Now, the goal is
to find a maximum-size subset of voters such that the profile restricted to this subset is
single-crossing. To achieve this goal, we use two further notions: Let S(V ) := {≻v| v ∈ V }
be the set of the preference orders of all voters from V . Without loss of generality, let
S(V ) := {≻1,≻2, . . . ,≻n′}. For each preference order ≻∈ S(V ), let #(≻, V ) denote the
number of voters in V with the same preference order ≻. By Observation 1, it follows that
finding the maximum-size single-crossing voter subset is equivalent to finding a single-crossing
subset S ′ ⊆ S(V ) of preference orders that maximizes the sum
∑
≻∈S′
#(≻, V ).
Now, observe that if ≻ is the first preference order along the single-crossing order over
set S ′, then for each two further preference orders ≻′,≻′′∈ S ′ with ≻′ being the predecessor
of ≻′′ along the single-crossing order, by Lemma 1, it holds that ∆(≻,≻′) ⊆ ∆(≻,≻′′). This
inspires us to build a directed graph based on the set inclusion relation and then, to find a
maximum-weight path. Thus, the idea of our algorithm is to first construct a directed graph
with weighted arcs and then to find a maximum-weight path on this graph. We will provide
an example to illustrate this idea right after this proof.
The construction of the desired directed graph works as follows: For each two num-
bers z, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n′}, we construct one vertex uzi ; this vertex will represent the preference
order ≻i in a linear order starting with preference order ≻z. Then, for each further num-
ber i′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n′} with i 6= i′, we add an arc with weight #(≻i′ , V ) from vertex vzi to
vertex vzi′ if ∆(≻z,≻i) ⊆ ∆(≻z,≻i′). Finally, we construct a root vertex ur, and for each
number z ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n′}, we add an arc with weight #(≻z , V ) from root ur to uzz. This
completes the construction. Observe that the constructed directed graph is acyclic:
1. For each three numbers z, z′, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n′} with z 6= z′, there are no arcs between
vertices uzi and u
z′
i .
2. For each three numbers z, i, i′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n′} with i 6= i′, a path from uzi to u
z
i′ implies
that ∆(≻z,≻i) ⊆ ∆(≻z,≻i′), while a path from uzi′ to u
z
i implies that ∆(≻z,≻i′) ⊆
∆(≻z,≻i). Thus, both paths cannot exist simultaneously because ≻i 6=≻i′ .
Now, an order of the vertices along a maximum-weight directed path corresponds to a sub-
set S ′ ⊆ S(V ) of preference orders, such that S ′ is single-crossing, and the sum
∑
≻∈S′
#(≻, V )
is maximum: The second vertex on the maximum-weight path fixes the first preference order
of the single-crossing order. Each successive vertex uzi on the path represents the successive
preference order ≻i in the single-crossing order (this is true by Lemma 1 and by the way we
define an arc). The arc weights ensure that the sum of the weights on the path equals the
total number of represented voters.
As to the running time analysis, we need O(n ·m) time to compute the set S(V ). Then,
for each two (not necessarily distinct) preference orders ≻,≻′∈ S(V ), we compute ∆(≻,≻′).
This can be done by checking the relative order of each pair of alternatives in O(n2 · m2)
time. Further, we construct the directed graph in O(n3 ·m2) time. Finally, we compute the
maximum-weight path in a directed acyclic graph with n2 vertices and n3 arcs in O(n3) time.
To achieve this, we first replace all positive weights w with −w, and then use the algorithm
in the textbook of Cormen et al. [18, Sec 24.2] to find a minimum-weight path. In total, the
running time is O(n3 ·m2).
Consider a profile P with three alternatives a, b, c and four voters v1, v2, v3, v4 whose
preference orders are depicted in Figure 3(a). This profile is not single-crossing since it
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voter v1 : a ≻ b ≻ c,
voter v2 : a ≻ b ≻ c,
voter v3 : b ≻ c ≻ a,
voter v4 : c ≻ a ≻ b.
(a)
ur
a≻b≻c
b≻c≻a
1
c≻a≻b
1
2
b≻c≻a
a≻b≻c
2
c≻a≻b
1
1
c≻a≻b
a≻b≻c
2
b≻c≻a
1
1
(b)
Figure 3: An example illustrating how to construct a weighted directed graph for a given
profile. (a) A profile with four voters and three alternatives. Note that the first two voters
have the same preference orders and that this profile is not single-crossing. (b) A weighted
directed graph for the left profile. Note that we label each vertex with its corresponding
preference order. The weight on an arc denotes the number of voters in the profile that
have the preference order labeled in the source vertex. For instance, there is an arc from the
root ur to its left most “child” a≻b≻c with weight 2. This means that the left profile has two
voters with preference order a≻b≻c.
contains a γ-configuration with regard to the alternatives a, c, a, b, a, b and voters v1, v3, v4.
The set of the preference orders of all voters is {a ≻ b ≻ c, b ≻ c ≻ a, c ≻ a ≻ b}. According
to our algorithm of finding a single-crossing profile with maximum number of voters, we
first construct a weighted directed graph as depicted in Figure 3(b). Then, we will find a
maximum-weight path in the graph. We can verify that there are four maximum-weight
paths, including this one ur → (a ≻ b ≻ c) → (b ≻ c ≻ a) with weight three. A single-
crossing profile with maximum number of voters has three voters. For instance, the profile
with voters v1, v2, v3.
6 Conclusion
In terms of computational complexity theory, this work is one of the starting points for
preference profiles which are “close” to being nicely structured. We have shown that making
a profile single-crossing by deleting as few voters as possible can be solved in polynomial
time. In contrast, making a profile nicely structured by deleting at most k voters or at most k
alternatives is NP-hard for all other considered cases. However, we mention in passing that all
these problems become tractable when k is small: All considered properties are characterized
by a fixed number of forbidden substructures. Thus, by branching over all possible voters
(resp. alternatives) of each forbidden substructure in the profile one obtains a fixed-parameter
algorithm [21, 23, 33, 43] that is efficient for small distances. One line of future research is
to investigate more sophisticated and more efficient (fixed-parameter) algorithms to compute
the distance of a profile to a nicely structured one [25].
A second line of research which was started by Erde´lyi et al. [29] for single-peaked profiles
is to study further distance measures such as “the number of pairs of alternatives to swap”.
Besides the domain restrictions studied in this paper, there is also a very nicely structured
property in the literature, the so-called 1-D Euclidean representation. It models the ability
to place voters and alternatives onto a real line such that a voter prefers an alternative
to another one if and only if the first one is closer to the voter. 1-D Euclidean profiles
are necessarily single-peaked and single-crossing. The last two properties, however, are not
sufficient to characterize the 1-D Euclidean profile [16, 17, 28]. In fact, Chen et al. [16]
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show that the 1-D Euclidean profile cannot be characterized by finitely many forbidden
substructures. Nevertheless, recognizing 1-D Euclidean profiles can be done in polynomial
time [22, 24, 38]. The computational complexity of making a profile 1-D Euclidean using a
minimum number of modifications remains unexplored.
A third line of research investigates whether and in which way tractability for nicely
structured preference profiles transfers to profiles that are only close to being nicely structured
(see also key questions 6 and 7 in [14]). It was started by Cornaz et al. [19, 20], Faliszewski
et al. [32], Skowron et al. [48], Yang and Guo [52] who look into several notions of nearly
nicely structured profiles which are different from, but related to ours. There are cases where
the computational tractability of voting problems on nicely structured profiles transfers to
nearly nicely structured profiles and cases where the vulnerability disappears even if the
preference profile is extremely close to being nicely-structured.
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